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IN this chapter I wish to discuss the ethical dimensions of a variety of issues in devel-
opment and international economics that I confronted as a member and chairman of 
the Council of Economic Advisers under President Clinton and as chief economist of 
the World Bank.i,2 Economists have long bought into the importance of self-interest 
not only in explaining behavior, but also in yielding efficient outcomes. But economists 
have also long been aware of the limitations of these perspectives. Not only does the 
self-interest/market paradigm often fail to generate efficient outcomes, but even when it 
does, these outcomes may not comport with notions of social justice. Still, in the realm 
of economic policy, governments typically justify foreign aid and other policies aimed 
at poorer countries in terms of their own self-interest: how such policies increase world 
incomes, thereby increasing the country's own exports, or contribute to global political 
stability, from which all benefit. Such arguments deflect attention from the moral justifi-
cation for these policies. 
Ethics in the relationship between developed and less developed countries dictate 
that the developed countries treat the less developed countries fairly, aware of their 
1 The author is University Professor at Columbia University. He previously served as senior vice 
president and chief economist of the World Bank and as Chairman of the US Council of Economic 
Advisers under President Clinton. 
2 This paper was prepared for the Inter-American Initiative on Social Capital, Ethics and 
Development, December 2002; earlier versions were presented in 2000 at a meeting in Milan sponsored 
by the Vatican in connection with the Jubilee, and at a conference at the Interamerican Develop1nent 
Bank in Washington, DC. The content has not been significantly updated since the original drafting. 
Before publication in 2013, I inserted an occasional footnote or parenthetical remark on how matters 
have evolved since then. 
496 JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ 
disadvantaged economic position, and acknowledging that taking advantage of one's 
own economic power will inevitably hurt the poor within developing countries. We 
have seen several instances where, in global economic relationships, this precept has 
been grossly violated: an international trade agenda set to advance the interests of the 
more developed countries, at least partially at the expense of the less developed-so 
much so that on average the world's poorest region was actually worse off at the end of 
the last round of trade negotiations; and an international environmental agreement that 
provided that those rich countries that today are polluting more be entitled to continue 
polluting more into the future.3 
There are other dimensions to globalization that illustrate the same violation of basic 
ethical precepts. Consider the argument made for free capital mobility: it increases 
world efficiency. Never mind the devastation that it might bring to small, poor coun-
tries-and the poor within those countries-that are not able to withstand the seem-
ingly irrational vicissitudes of investor sentiments and the consequent reversals of 
capital flows! But globalization in these factor movements is much like globalization in 
trade: there we saw the powerful tell the less developed countries to open their markets 
to the goods of the more industrial countries, while keeping their own markets closed. 
The factor that the developed countries export is capital, while the factor that the devel-
oping countries have in abundance is labor. From an economic perspective, global effi-
ciency can be attained by free mobility of labor every bit as well as it can be attained 
through free mobility of capital. But the developed countries are not arguing that there 
should be free mobility oflabor. They are not offering to open up their doors to the poor 
of the world. The reason is obvious: they are aware of the social dislocation-and the 
consequent political pressure-that such migration would bring about. But they simply 
cannot put themselves in the shoes of the developing countries. And they are unsympa-
thetic when the developing countries raise precisely the same objections to opening up 
their countries to the factors and goods that are in abundance in the developed world. 4 
I shall conduct my discussion at the level of pragmatic ethics, that is, I shall not try to 
derive the ethical principles from first-order considerations. Rather, I shall explore the 
implications of certain widely held ethical precepts for the conduct ofinternational eco-
nomic relations and, by extension, the conduct of development and other economists 
who operate in this environment. By the same token, I shall evaluate certain actions, 
3 In the case of international trade agreements, there was the hope that the round of negotiations 
begun in November, 2001 at Doha would rectify the imbalances of earlier trade agreements; it was even 
called the development round. But in the more than a decade since the inauguration of this round, the 
developed countries reneged, so much so that the round no longer deserves that epithet. Indeed, some 
of the bilateral and so-called "partnership" agreements have been as or even more unbalanced than the 
agreements of the past. So, too, there was hope for a global agreement affecting climate change in which 
the developed countries lived up to their moral responsibilities. But this has not been forthcoming, 
either. 
4 Interestingly, more than a decade after the IMF attempted, in Hong Kong in 1997, to change its 
charter to enable it to force countries to liberalize their capital markets, the Fund recognized that capital 
market restrictions can be an important tool for countries to help stabilize their economy. 
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ascertaining which can be viewed as principled actions. I shall not undertake the far 
more ambitious goal of defining a set of principles for action, though to be sure, my 
remarks are intended as a prelude to that task. I will use this occasion to raise questions 
as much as provide answers.5 
I focus on five concepts in particular: honesty, fairness, social justice (including a 
concern for the poor), externalities, and responsibility. Although the meaning of most 
of these terms should be self-evident, let me briefly comment on each. Honesty goes 
beyond the dictate to refrain from outright lying; it comes closer to the dictum of tell-
ing the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. Misrepresentation-asserting 
that there is evidence for some proposition when there is none-violates the principle 
of honesty.6 Fairness includes what economists call horizontal equity-either treat-
ing everyone the same (e.g., not discriminating on the basis of race or gender), or, to 
the extent that it is desirable to treat those in different circumstances differently (e.g., 
the aged and the handicapped may need special treatment), treating those in similar 
positions similarly. The hard question, of course, is, What are meaningful differences, 
differences that could justify differences in treatment? Favoritism-including giving 
special treatment to special interests-is thus a violation of the ethical norm of fair-
ness. Social justice includes helping those in need, and doing so in ways that enhance 
their sense of dignity and the ability to assume individual responsibility for themselves. 
"Externalities" entail that individuals should not impose costs on others. Littering is, in 
this view, "wrong;' a violation of an ethical norm. Responsibility is the ethical norm that 
individuals should take responsibility for their own actions and for the consequences of 
those actions. 
Ethical issues arise in every aspect of economics and economic policymaking. We 
recognize, for instance, the ethical problems posed by conflict of interest; and that the 
multitude of positions that individuals have also makes such conflict of interest inevi-
table. Today, modern ethical norms require disclosure of significant conflict of inter-
est, reflecting the precept of honesty. It is not commonly viewed to be immoral to take 
actions, in the role of a fiduciary, or to provide advice, from which one might oneself 
benefit. But it is immoral not to disclose the conflict of interest, so that those affected 
5 Much of what I have to say could be justified in terms of more general principles, for example, Kant's 
categorical imperative, or the Rawlsian analysis of social justice. The latter may be particlllarlyuseful in 
approaching the issues of equity discussed below: What kind of international social and economic order 
would one want behind the veil of ignorance, not knowing whether one would be born in a developed or 
developing country? Toward the end of this chapter, I shall try to put some of the ethical precepts into a 
broader context: the rules and norms that facilitate cooperative social interactions. 
6 Honesty is a precept that can be taken as a value on its own, or as instrumental: actions taken 
on the basis of distorted information may lead to adverse results. Presumably, one of the reasons for 
dishonesty is to induce others to take actions that were they to know· the truth, they would not. 1hus, not 
disclosing fully the risks of capital market liberalization-and purporting that there are gains from such 
liberalization when there is little evidence that there are such gains-may induce countries to liberalize 
when, were they provided with more accurate information, they would not. Even if the country would 
have, in any case, liberalized its capital markets, the distorted information may lead it not to provide the 
safety net that it would have provided, were it fully aware of the risks. 
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can take appropriate precautions. The modern theory of agency recognizes that agents 
do not in general adopt the interests of those (the principal) whom they are supposed 
to be serving as their own; it is the responsibility of the principal to design incentive 
structures that align those interests, as much as possible. But it is wrong for the agent, for 
instance, to steal, to accept ldckbacks from clients, or to engage in a host of other corrupt 
practices. 
Advisors face ethical issues. Government bureaucrats and elected officials face ethical 
issues, such as those associated with corruption. Governments face ethical issues in the 
design of programs; and international institutions face ethical issues. I begin this chap-
ter by subjecting the role of economic advisor to ethical analysis: What does it mean to 
be an ethical economic advisor? The question is an important one, because the internaw 
tional financial institutions are actively involved in providing economic advice. In doing 
so, do they behave ethically? I then examine specific issues: ethics in the treatment of 
developing countries by developed countries, for example, ethics in the areas of trade, 
global environmental policies, debt forgiveness, growth strategies, crisis management, 
and finally, ethical issues in population policy. 
THE ETHICS OF THE ECONOMIC ADVISOR 
Most professions have clear ethical principles. In medicine, these are embedded in the 
Hippocratic Oath, which includes doing no harm. In a sense, the ethical norms seek to 
mitigate the adverse consequences of the unbridled pursuit of self-interest, in particular 
those that arise whenever there are agency problems (where, because oflack of informa-
tion, one party can take advantage of another). Violating these ethical principles harms 
the entire profession (there is, in this sense, an externality). It destroys trust. It is, for 
instance, unethical for a doctor to prescribe a medicine because he receives a kickback 
from the manufacturer. The patient, not knowing the reason a doctor prescribes a par-
ticular medicine over another, assumes the doctor is prescribing the medicine in the 
best interest of the patient. Thus, actions that could lead to a conflict of interest between 
the professional and the person for whom he or she is providing a service are unethical. 
Since a central part of the service being provided by most professions is information, 
honesty is a critical virtue. 
There is a large economic cost to the destruction of trust. In simplistic models, indi-
vidual self-interest leads to efficient outcomes; individuals act, and are expected to act, 
in their self-interest. But in modern theories in which information imperfections and 
incomplete markets play an important role, self-interested behavior in general does not 
yield efficient outcomes. Equilibria based on trust can yield better outcomes than those 
in which trust is absent. The patient, for instance, will be induced to get second and 
third opinions, because he will doubt the disinterested nature of the doctor's advice, ifhe 
believes that the doctor has a large financial stake in that advice. There is thus an instru" 
mental argument for ethical behavior. 
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Some principles governing the behavior of economic advisors are straightfor· 
ward. Clearly, there is an ethical mandate not to take advantage of inside information 
obtained as an advisor for profit, or to directly use connections generated in an advisory 
role for profit.7 Furthermore, there are ethical (and often legal) norms for disclosure. 
Transparency mitigates, but does not totally eliminate, the danger that advice would be 
driven by self-interest. A consultant to a firm that had a short position in the stock of 
the firm would have an incentive to provide advice that would lead to the decrease in 
the market value of the firm. Few firms would allow the consultant to maintain such a 
position were they to know about it. Similarly, a consultant hired to advise a firm on the 
choice of a supplier should not have a financial interest in one of the suppliers, and ifhe 
does, he should disclose it; to not do so would be unethical. 
But there are less straightforward implications as well, and it is these to which I 
want to call attention. First, honesty requires full disclosure of the limits of knowledge. 
Indeed, this has become an explicit part of the norms of good science. In the hard sci· 
ences one always presents the range of estimates, the confidence intervals with which 
certain results are held. The recognition of these uncertainties is even more important in 
the social sciences. Different propositions are held with different degrees of confidence. 
For instance, economists can claim with considerable certainty that hyperinflation has 
adverse effects on the economy. We can claim with some confidence that capital market 
liberalization is associated with greater risks, particularly for small, open, developing 
economies. On the other hand, honesty would dictate that an advisor recommending 
capital market liberalization reveals the absence of empirical evidence proving that cap· 
ital market liberalization leads to faster growth (or at least after any supposed evidence is 
ambiguous and wealc), and that economic theories supporting capital market liberaliza· 
tion are disputed. He would qualify any argument that capital account liberalization is 
helpful in inducing foreign direct investment by pointing out that the developing coun· 
try that has been most successful in recruiting foreign direct investment-China-has 
not liberalized its capital account. 
Second, honesty requires revealing that there is more than one Pareto-efficient policy. 
There are tradeoffs, with different policies affecting different groups differently, impos· 
ing different risks on different segments of society. Economic advice should focus on 
ensuring the efficiency of policies (to put it technically, to ensure that the economy is 
on the Pareto frontier), but it is the responsibility of political processes to choose the 
points on the Pareto frontier. When an economist recommends a particular point on the 
frontier as if it were the only efficient policy, he is using the cover of his supposed eco· 
nomic expertise to advance a political position. This is a misrepresentation. It becomes 
7 Tue most famous instance in recent years of an alleged violation of this ethical norm was in Russia, 
where tvvo of the American advisors were accused of using their inside connections to obtain licenses 
fOr friends to establish funds. (Subsequent to the publication of the original version of this chapter, 
an in-depth of analysis of these events was provided by David McClintick, and severe penalties were 
ilnposed on Harvard University and Andrei Shleifer.) See McClintick, David. 2006. "How Harvard Lost 
Russia." Institutional Investor, January. 
500 JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ 
a particularly serious misrepresentation when the advisor, or interests with which he is 
affiliated, might be expected to benefit disproportionately from the particular policies 
being pursued. For instance, if there are a range of policies, some of which are more 
advantageous to those in the financial market, it would be unethical for an advisor rep-
resenting financial interests not to disclose the fact that the particular policy he advo-
cates would be particular advantageous to those groups. 8 
But in the public sphere today, there is a problem of "revolving doors;' which are a 
manifestation of exactly these kinds of ethical conflicts. Individuals have what might be 
viewed as a contingent interest. Those who serve special interests well while in public ser-
vice often get rewarded with lucrative positions after public service. Many governments 
are aware of the conflict of interest to which this gives rise. To mitigate the inevitable, 
related ethical issues, they insist that those who leave government service do not, for a 
period of time, enter into the employ of those where there might be a conflict of interest. 
Or, governments restrict the kinds of activities in which former public servants can be 
engaged. Certainly without such rules (but even with them) it would be unethical to give 
advice that favors those interests, without disclosing both the consequences for those 
groups and what might be viewed as the contingent interest of the advisor. (To be sure, 
the firms hiring these "devoted" public servants claim that they do so not as a reward for 
past services but on the basis of demonstrated acumen while in public service. It should 
be obvious that it is virtually impossible to draw the line between the two.) 
Third, concern for social justice should make an economic advisor particularly atten-
tive to the consequences of policies for the poor. Information does affect action, and 
although economists have a moral responsibility not to impose their values, they also 
have a moral responsibility to ensure the information is available on the basis' of which 
moral policy decisions-for instance, decisions that reflect the principles of social jus-
tice-can be made.9 If a policy imposes risks on the economy, then the advisor should 
point that out, especially if the risks are borne disproportionately by the poor. To the 
extent possible, there is a moral responsibility to think creatively about what kinds of 
policies might enhance the opportunities for the poor, allowing them to take more 
responsibility for their own well-being. Similarly, since there is a moral imperative to be 
concerned with future generations, economists should be attentive to the policies' affect 
on the environment, and should provide information that can lead to better environ-
mental policies.10 
8 In the context of the Great Recession brought about by the financial crisis, the documentary movie 
Inside Job highlighted the many conflict of interest of several key economists in policy~making position 
and/or who had taken prominent public positions. 
9 I realize that there is a fine line that I am treading: I argued earlier that the economist should, in 
effect, distinguish the economist's role in defining opportunity sets from the political task of choosing 
among the points in the opportunity set. But the information supplied about the points in the 
opportunity set-for example, their impact on the poor-can affect the choices made. Someone not 
sharing the values, not concerned for the poor, might argue not only that providing that information is 
irrelevant, but also that it distorts the political process of decision making. 
10 We should thus view "green accounting" not just as a matter of providing a good accounting 
framework, but as a moral issue. 
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These are general precepts that apply to all policy advisors. I have argued that one 
of the advantages of the institutional structure of the Council of Economic Advisers in 
the United States is that it reduces the scope for conflict of interests.U The members are 
appointed for a short term and return to academia. Thus their incentive is to provide rel-
atively accurate information, advice that will stand up to the scrutiny of their academic 
peers. The norms of the economics profession require making most of the distinctions 
I have alluded to, including distinguishing between special interests and general inter-
ests, efficiency effects and distribution effects. (Furthermore, US government regula-
tions require that they dispense of all financial interests or put them into blind trusts; 
and in any case, few have substantial financial interests.) 
One of the main activities of the international financial institutions is giving advice. 
In assessing the way that international financial institutions dispense advice, I fuel that 
all too often they fall short on all counts described above. They push a particular set of 
policies, as loan conditionalities, rather than outlining the range of policies and trade-offs 
and then encouraging the countries themselves to take responsibility for choosing among 
alternative policies. They fail to clarify the uncertainties associated with the policies they 
promote, maldng assertions about the policies' efficacy that cannot be supported by evi-
dence. Most importantly, at least in the past, they have not only failed to pay due concern 
to possible adverse effects of the policies on the poor, but they also have not even dis-
closed the likely risks. They have continually pushed policies entailing "pain;' seemingly 
almost oblivious to who within the country has to bear that pain. Many of their policies 
seem to disproportionately benefit financial interests, and they fail both to point this out, 
and to disclose what I have viewed as the contingent interests of their staff-evidenced by 
the fact that many staff members leave the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or World 
Bank to work for private financial institutions.12 
FACING MORAL DILEMMAS 
AS AN ECONOMIC ADVISOR 
This brings me to perhaps the hardest moral question facing the policy advisor. 
What should he do when confronted with a policy that he believes is, in some sense, 
"immoral"? Should he speak out, but thereby risk possibly losing influence? Is silence 
a form of complicity? There are no easy answers, but a couple of examples may help 
illustrate the nature of the dilemma. When President Lyndon B. Johnson's economic 
advisors tried to forecast where the economy was going (and therefore what kinds of 
11 See Stiglitz, Joseph. 1997. "Looldng Out for the National Interest: The Principles of the Council of 
Economic Advisers:' American Economic Review 87(2): 109-113. 
12 In 2002, the number two person in the IMF moved directly fro1n the IMF to take the 
vice-chairmanship of Citibank Group. 
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macro-policies would be required to sustain noninflationary full employment), they 
were confronted with the following problem: The government was spending more on 
the Vietnam War than it would admit to. On the one hand, the advisors could pretend 
that the official numbers were correct, thereby recommending a clearly misguided fiscal 
policy. On the other hand, they could choose not to use the official numbers and instead 
to use more accurate numbers, but this would violate the "confidences" of government. 
But maintaining this confidence was in itself morally questionable: in democratic soci-
eties, one might argue there is a moral imperative for openness and transparency; after 
all, a public official is the "servant" of the people and the people have a right to know 
what the government is doing. 
A few years later, President Ronald Reagan's economic advisor, Martin Feldstein, 
faced a similar problem. He had long argued for the importance of high national savings. 
Yet Reagan had pushed a tax cut that resulted in huge deficits, potentially undermining 
the future prosperity of the country. A few economists predicted that, contrary to all the 
evidence, the tax cut would generate enough growth so that there would not be a defi-
cit. Intellectual honesty would require discussing the absence of evidence for that con-
clusion, and the risks associated with the high deficits. In this instance, Feldstein took 
a strong public stand, pointing out the potential adverse consequences of the policy; 
but in doing so, he undermined the effectiveness of the Council of Economic Advisers 
within the Reagan administration. 
I faced a similar dilemma as chief economist at the World Bank. I believed the policies 
pursued by the IMF in the wake of the East Asia financial crisis would lead to deeper, 
longer recessions and depressions than necessary. I believed that the financial interests 
of the foreign creditors were placed above the concerns for the poor and small busi-
nesses. The policies pushed by the IMF, I believed, would almost surely wreak havoc 
on their lives and livelihoods. I tried, quietly and within the institutional processes, to 
change the policies, or at least to promote open discussion of the policies (given my 
belief that the errors were so obvious that any open discussion would quickly bring 
about a reversal of course). But with the great institutional rigidities (and the powerful 
special interests and their ideologies), I not only could not reverse policies, but I also 
could not even engender open discourse. It seemed to me that there was a basic moral 
issue: How could I remain silent? I felt a strong moral obligation to speak out, and at the 
very least, to point out the risks of these policies. 
The moral stance of those who worked hard to quash public discussions had irrec-
oncilable contradictions. They argued that open discussion could undermine confi-
dence in the policies, and the lack of confidence would impede the desired effects. Thus, 
speaking out was, in their minds, wrong, because without the confidence, capital would 
continue to flow out of the country, and this capital outflow would further weaken the 
economy, hurting the poor. They were arguing, in effect, not only for a lack of openness 
and transparency, but also for a kind of dishonesty: asserting that the policies were likely 
to be more effective than the evidence warranted. The dangers of this stance should be 
obvious. In almost every arena, government could argue that dishonesty, partial truths, 
are "means" that justify the ends. To be sure, the Treasury or IMF may believe in their 
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cases. But the Department of Defense may argue the same thing about every aspect of 
its activities (from the toxicity of Agent Orange to the trne magnitude of the threat of 
an enemy13). Such positions are not only dangerous and undermining of democracy, 
but are also ultimately self-defeating. Repeated assertions of this kind destroy the cred-
ibility of government In the economic arena, they are particularly problematic, because 
the predictions will frequently be proven wrong, and the ex post excuses always seem 
absurd. Indeed, the IMF's overconfident forecasts have created a lack of credibility that 
itself contributes to the Jack of efficacy of the Fund's policies. In the end, this lack of cred-
ibility made my decision easier: whether I spoke out or not would have little effect on the 
confidence in the policy; but speaking out might have some effect on the policy chosen, 
thereby averting, or at least reducing, the recessionary consequences. 
In general, there is no easy answer to these moral dilemmas facing the policy advisor. 
Each situation is different. One must make a critical judgment about which actions will 
most likely bring about the actions that one believes are morally right In some cases, 
resignation may be the most effective answer; but even when that is contemplated, there 
is an important issue of timing. A well-timed resignation can sometimes bring about 
change more effectively than any amount of argumentation. The resignation is often 
seen as a costly move, and as such, the fact that a public official-who has often worked 
hard to obtain the prominent position-is willing to undertal(e such a measure provides 
an effective signal concerning the depth offeeling on the issue.14 
ETHICS AND INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC POLICY 
I have argued that, though we expect individuals to act by and large in their self-interest, 
there are circumstances in which we say such behavior is unethical. So too for countries. 
We expect countries, by and large, to pursue policies that are in the interests of their citi-
zens. But there are limits-behaviors that are unethical, or border on the unethical. To 
some, for a rich and powerful country to go back on its word is simply real politick: what 
can anyone do in retaliation? Some would go further, and say for government officials 
not to do so would be abrogating their responsibilities to their citizens, whose welfare 
they are supposed to be maximizing. If they can do so by lying, cheating, or stealing, so 
13 A point that was brought out even more forcefully by the events leading to the Iraq War, sometime 
after this speech was delivered. 
14 A case in point, which emerged after the original version of this chapter was completed: Ravi 
Kanbur served as the director of the World Bank's decennial World Development Report on poverty. 
Tue version that he submitted for consideration emphasized not only income poverty, but also lack: of 
voice and insecurity. Tue US Treasury (and in particular the Secretary of Treasury) insisted on the more 
narrow focus; with Kanbur's resignation, and the resulting civil society protest, the report that emerged 
reflected the original vision. 
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there are circumstances in which we say such behavior is unethical. So too for countries. 
We expect countries, by and large, to pursue policies that are in the interests of their citi-
zens. But there are limits-behaviors that are unethical, or border on the unethical. To 
some, for a rich and powerful country to go back on its word is simply real politick: what 
can anyone do in retaliation? Some would go further, and say for government officials 
not to do so would be abrogating their responsibilities to their citizens, whose welfare 
they are supposed to be maximizing. If they can do so by lying, cheating, or stealing, so 
13 A point that was brought out even more forcefully by the events leading to the Iraq War, sometime 
after this speech was delivered. 
14 A case in point, which emerged after the original version of this chapter was completed: Ravi 
Kanbur served as the director of the World Bank's decennial World Development Report on poverty. 
The version that he submitted for consideration emphasized not only income poverty, but also lack of 
voice and insecurity. Tue US Treasury (and in particular the Secretary of Treasury) insisted on the more 
narrow focus; with Kanbur's resignation, and the resulting civil society protest, the report that emerged 
reflected the original vision. 
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be it. Again, however, one can argue against such behavior on instrumental grounds. In 
today's world even a powerful country needs the cooperation ofothers, and if it develops 
a reputation for mistreating others-for dishonesty, for breaking its word-it will find 
it more difficult eliciting that cooperation. The lack of trust has even more important 
consequences in the international arena than in the arena of domestic economics; in the 
latter, legal enforcement mechanisms can provide a partial substitute for trust. In the 
international arena, that is not the case. 
In the following subsections, I review several recent issues in international economic 
policy through the lens of practical ethics. Each of these issues can be approached in 
other ways, and I do not intend to provide a comprehensive treatment of any of them. I 
do believe, however, that approaching these issues from an ethical perspective provides 
new insights-including insights into why it is that some of these issues have taken on 
such moral overtones. 
Debt Forgiveness 
Debt forgiveness has become the subject of enormous public discussion.15 There seems 
something peculiar about very poor countries transferring money to richer countries 
year after year. Many countries have to spend a huge fraction of their export earnings to 
service their debts, leaving little remaining to spend on improving the plight of the poor. 
The debt overhang impedes growth and poverty reduction. Without debt forgiveness, 
prospects for these countries are bleak. 
Here, I do not want to address the economic issues, but rather the moral issues and 
dilemmas. There are four, in particular, that have not received sufficient attention. The 
first concerns fairness among developing countries. The amount of resources trans-
ferred from the rich to the poor will, in any case, be limited. The question is, Who will 
receive these funds? The funds used for debt forgiveness could have been used to aid 
other needy countries, in particular countries that are equally poor, but had repaid their 
debt. It seems unfair, to say the least, that those who have lived up to the terms of the 
loan contract should be in the same or worse position than those who do not. 
The second issue revolves around the moral responsibility of the lenders. Consider 
loans made to Mobutu Sese Seko in his heyday. The lenders knew of his corruption. 
They knew that the money would not go to the people in the country. At best, it was Cold 
War lending, pure and simple. At worst, it was lending to ensure that Western compa-
nies could continue to exploit the rich natural resources of that country. Why should the 
people of Zaire-who had no say in the choice of Mobutu as their leader-have had to 
pay for the money that was given to him, and which he squandered? Doesn't the moral 
responsibility lie with the lender? (Such debts have come to be called otiose debts, with 
many critics of the lending policies suggesting that there is no moral obligation on the 
15 1his chapter was -written at the time of the Jubilee movement, which successfully called for 
large-scale debt forgiveness for the world's poores~ countries. 
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part of the debtor to repay the debt, and that there is a moral obligation on the part 
of the creditor to forgive the debt.) In any case, every loan is a voluntary transaction 
between the lender and the borrower; as such, if a loan is made that shouldn't have been, 
the lender is as much at fault as the borrower. Indeed, in a fundamental sense, he may 
be more to blame: lenders have better knowledge of risks, and they typically have been 
rewarded for those risks by interest rates that are in excess of the safe interest rate, some-
times considerably so. 
The case just described seems like an easy one, where the moral responsibility of 
the lenders cannot be avoided. But there are cases that might seem slightly more prob-
lematic. Consider the 1998 IMF loan to Russia. In that case, there was an elected gov-
ernment, though one for which there was considerable evidence of corruption. It was 
perfectly clear at the time that Russia's exchange rate was overvalued; the overvalued 
exchange rate was having an adverse effect on their economy; the IMF-imposed con-
tractionary policies (part of the conditionalities imposed for assistance) caused a deep 
plunge in its economy leading to enormous increases in poverty (from 2 percent under 
the previous regime to almost 50 percent by 1998); and the policies of privatization and 
free capital outflows that the Fund also had pushed led to a few oligarchs accumulat-
ing huge amounts of wealth. Should the IMF have lent billions of dollars to the country 
knowing what it did? They knew full well that there was a high likelihood the funds 
would simply enable a few oligarchs to take more money out of the country, and that it 
would saddle the country with increased indebtedness. They knew that the poor taxpay-
ers would eventually have to pay back the funds borrowed. And they knew that, in any 
case, lending was unlikely to facilitate the resumption of growth (and indeed, by sustain-
ing the exchange rate at an overvalued level, actually had an adverse effect on growth). If 
the IMF did lend the country money, and if the money then was, in effect, used to enable 
oligarchs to take more of their wealth out of the country on more favorable terms, and 
if the economic polices failed, what is the moral obligation of the citizens of the country 
to repay the loan, or of the Fund to forgive the loan? What is the moral responsibility for 
their misguided advice, for their complicity in providing funds where there was such a 
high likelihood of abuse? 
The third issue concerns the nature of the debt contract, and the advice given to the 
countries. In well-functioning capital markets, the risk associated with any contract is 
divided among the parties, with the party most able to bear the risk bearing the risk dis-
proportionately. But capital markets do not work as well in practice as they do in theory. 
It is the developing countries that bear the brunt of the risks associated with exchange 
rate and interest rate changes, and it is large changes in exchange rates and interest rates 
that have led many of the countries to their current predicament. The international 
financial institutions, of course, have the opportunity-I might say the obligation-to 
design contracts that reflect an appropriate sharing of the risk burden, but they have 
failed to do so. And they have failed, in many cases, to advise the country of the risks 
associated with the borrowing policies that they recommended. For instance, prior to 
the Russian 1998 crisis, the IMF advised Russia to borrow in dollars, seemingly because 
the interest rate was lower. But the IMF, of all institutions, believes in well-functioning 
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markets and should have also pointed out that if markets were working well, then the 
differences in interest rates (between the dollar and ruble rates) reflected the risk of 
exchange rate change, and that if Russia did borrow more in dollars, the consequences in 
the event of a devaluation (which at the time seemed highly likely) would be very severe. 
The moral weight for debt forgiveness seems greater because of these poorly designed 
contracts and the incomplete, and in some cases, misguided advice. 
The fourth issue relates to the conflict of interest that I brought up earlier in this chap-
ter. One of the functions of the large bailout loans has been to provide funds with which 
Western banks can be repaid. There are potential conflict of interest (at the individual16 
and organizationallevels17): much of the benefits to these loans arguably go to the banks 
and other Western financial interests, with the costs being borne by workers and oth-
ers within the country. Ethical advice and lending practice would require that this be 
pointed out. When there has not been adequate disclosure, what is the moral obligation 
of the borrower to repay, or of the lender to forgive? 
Ethical issues associated with repaying debts, and debt enforcement, are longstand-
ing and complicated. Over time, there has clearly been a change in ethical views. Debtor 
prisons were employed in the 19th century in Britain. Most people today would view 
such treatment as cruel punishment, unethical, no matter how strong the incentives for 
repayment it provides. Similarly, bonded labor, sometimes used as a debt enforcement 
mechanism in developing countries, is not only illegal in most countries, it is also uneth-
ical-just a step away from slavery. For a country to march into another to enforce adebt 
contract would also today be viewed as unethical, though it occurred several times in 
the 19th century. At the individual level, usurious interest rates and the imposition of 
other "conditions" associated with loan-sharking are viewed as nnethical. The extensive 
conditionalities imposed by the IMF in the context of the loans to countries in desper-
ate need for funds raise similar questions: When do such conditionalities represent an 
abuse of power, and in that sense, are they unethical? These are questions I briefly touch 
upon later. 
Providing Loans 
In approaching the problem of whether to give a country a loan, a simple question needs 
to be posed: Will the country, as a whole, be better off with the loan than without it, tak-
ing into account that it will be more indebted? If there is a reasonable chance that the 
country will be worse off, the moral case (as well as the economic case) is questionable. 
The incentives of the lending institution and its staff and the incentives of the borrowing 
16 That is, many of those responsible for making the loans have, and will have, connections with the 
financial institutions being bailed out. 
17 That is, finance ministries (US Treasury) and central banks, with close ties to the financial 
community in the advanced industrial countries-the lenders~are responsible for the lending 
decisions. 
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government may differ markedly from these moral dictates. The government may feel 
that the money will give it a chance to survive; if the money fails to work, it will be some-
one else's problem. To return to the IMF loan to Russia, one of the arguments for giving 
the money was that it would enhance the political survival of Boris Yeltsin, whom the 
United States and the IMF viewed as a friend. More to the point, the downfall of Yeltsin 
would be seen as a failure of!MF and US Treasury policy. The incentives of the IMF and 
the US Treasury did not necessarily, in this sense, coincide with the interests of Russia, 
though to be sure, the IMF and US Treasury might have thought that they were in a bet-
ter position to make the appropriate political judgments than were the voters in Russia. 
(The discrepancy between individual and organizational incentives has been empha-
sized in the organizational literature; for instance, the theory of escalating commitment 
points out that the cost to an individual of abandoning a strategy that he has advocated 
may be greater than the cost to the organization.). 
To provide another example: in the recent Argentina debacle, at the time of the 
August 2001 loan, even IMF Board members were skeptical that the money was going 
to make any difference. The country would be left more in debt, but the likelihood that it 
would enable the country to survive for more than a few months without a major default 
or devaluation was slim. It could conceivably be viewed, however, in the interests of a 
very senior official, who was about to depart. Not lending would have precipitated a cri-
sis then and there, and it would have made apparent that the policies he had pushed had 
been a dramatic failure. If there was even a small chance that the program might work, 
his policies might be vindicated. If they failed, he did not bear the costs: it was the people 
in the country that bore the increased indebtedness. So cynical had some of the Board 
members become at this juncture that they talked about the $8 billion as a going away 
present for the departing official; the money was likely to hold things together until he 
left the Fund, sparing him the immediate embarrassment, but not much longer. 
In short, there are reasons to believe that the interests of the borrowing government 
and lending institution (IMF) may differ markedly from those of the people in the coun-
try. The IMF and its staff would like to persuade others that they are unlike other public 
and private institutions: although they recognize the role of rent seeking and distorted 
incentives especially in governmental institutions, they themselves believe that they are 
immune from such distortions. There is little in the way of theory or evidence to support 
such a view. When money was lent to a country for reasons other than promoting the 
development of the country (e.g., to maintain friendship with the ruling government in 
the Cold War), the ethical case for debt forgiveness is enhanced; the moral obligation for 
repayment is reduced. 
Of course, in the case of private lending, there may not even be a pretense that it is in 
the long-run interests of the country. The lenders may make their money up front and 
often don't have to bear the full risk of the loan going bad-especially if they can syndi-
cate the loan and/or if they can count on a bailout by the IMF. 
So far, I have emphasized that there are nnmerous instances in which loans have been 
given when they arguably should not have been, raising ethical issues about repayment. 
There are similar issues when there are circumstances in which one might argue that 
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loans should be given but the money is withheld, or conditions are imposed, taking 
advantage of the weakened position of the borrower. Ecuador provides a possible exam-
ple. Providing money at a critical stage to a country facing a liquidity crisis because of a 
series of adverse shocks, including low oil prices, a weal< agricultural position because of 
El Niiio, or a disease affecting shrimp-one of its major export crops-would have made 
economic sense and would have been the ethical thing to do. And because of Ecuador's 
oil reserves, its long-term financial position was more positive. It might have enabled 
the survival of a democratically elected government. But the IMF had been extensively 
criticized for large bailouts; there was pressure for a policy of "bail-ins'' -private sector 
participation. It was too risky to try this new strategy on rich and powerful countries 
like Brazil and Russia; weak countries like Romania and Ecuador were chosen for the 
experiment, with adverse consequences for both. 
Developed Countries' Trade Policy 
The riots in Seattle brought home the extent of dissatisfaction with the way that inter-
national trade negotiations have been conducted, and are likely to be conducted in the 
future.18 The agenda had been set by the rich and powerful countries, to reflect vested 
interests in their countries. And the outcomes had reflected their economic power. 
Indeed, by one calculation, sub-Saharan Africa was actually worse off after the Urnguay 
round of trade negotiations (which was completed in 1994) than before. The United 
States pushed for liberalization of financial services and information technology and 
for more extensive protection of intellectual property. It was less concerned about other 
services, such as marine and construction, or even the potential adverse effects of the 
rigid enforcement of intellectual property on those in the developing countries whose 
lives depended on the availability of cheap drugs. In trade negotiations with Korea (and 
other countries), it pushed for rapid financial and capital market liberalization, know-
ing full well the risks that those policies imposed on the country.1' The welfare of the US 
financial commnnity was pnt above the welfare of the developing countries' workers. In 
dragging its feet in negotiations leading up to the admission of China to the World Trade 
Organization, the United States went so far as to argue that China was not a developing 
country-though the World Bank (and every other international agency) classifies it 
as such. 
18 For a moment, with the signing of the agreement marking the beginning of the Development 
Round trade negotiations in Doha in November, 2ooi, it seemed that the West had become aware of the 
imbalance, and that the inequities would be rectified. What happened in the subsequent years showed, 
however, that that was not to be the case. 
19 This policy was pushed by the US Treasury, even though the Council of Economic Advisers not 
only warned about the risks imposed by the policy and the dubious benefits to the country, but also 
argued that there were few benefits to the United States as a whole. The policy was another example of 
special interests having sway. 
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At one level, it is natural for a country to pursue its own interests. But, as I asked earlier, 
at what point does this pursuit of a country's own interest (or, as is more frequently the case, 
special interests within one's country) at the expense of the poor, become a moral issue? 
There is one aspect of these discussions that particularly troubles me as an economic advi-
sor: when the arguments used for the US position border on hypocrisy and dishonesty. For 
instance, while the United States (and the IMF) lectured developing countries on the evils 
of subsidies and the virtues of free trade, Western governments maintained huge subsides 
and trade barriers in agriculture, the areas of comparative advantage for many developing 
countries. The United States and Europe accused others of dumping-and under that ruse 
created new trade barriers-even though few economists would characterize what the coun-
tries were doing as dumping. It would have been better to be more honest and forthright, to 
admit that political pressures at home forced us to have policies that were hard to justify. 
GLOBAL EXTERNALITIES: 
THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 
We teach our children early on that it is wrong to litter. This is an example of an externality, 
an action by one individual that affects others and for which that individual does not bear 
the costs. Government policies are designed to limit the extent of externalities, but they are 
imperfect. Social control mechanisms-a sense of what is right and wrong, ethical presup-
positions-are more effective. The actions of those in one country similarly have effects on 
others, and given the absence or weaknesses of international law, there is a need for reliance 
on ethical norms. For instance, it is wrong for a country to locate a garbage dump on its 
boundary so thatthe downward wind pollutes the air ofits neighbor. 
The realization that we all share the same planet, that its resources are limited, and 
that bad policies can squander those resources, leaving future generations at risk, has 
come about only slowly. There is now general recognition of the dangers of global warm-
ing, and the Rio and Kyoto conventions are testimony to this global concern. But there is 
a deeply troubling aspect of the framework of these conventions. It is based on cutbacks 
in current emission levels. It is hard to detect an underlying principle of equity: the 
developed countries seem to have the right to pollute more than the less developed 
countries (on a per capita basis) simply because they have polluted more in the past. Is 
there any moral justification for such a policy? There are alternative frameworks, involv-
ing, for instance, agreements to undertake common policies (e.g., universal taxes on 
carbon emissions) that would seem to have a stronger ethical basis. The ethical stance 
of the United States, the largest emitter of greenhouse gases, both on a per capita basis 
and absolutely, is even harder to comprehend.20 It claims that it need not do anything 
because the developing countries have not bound themselves to doing anything, even 
20 Since this chapter was written, China has overtaken the United States as the largest emitter of 
greenhouse gases, though the United States still remains, by far, the largest polluter on a per capita basis. 
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though the build-up of greenhouse gases is largely due to the advanced industrial coun-
tries, and even though, were they to make a commitment not to emit at levels that exceed 
those of the United States on a per capita basis, it will be decades before that constraint 
will be binding. 
INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY, 
THE ENVIRONMENT, POPULATION POLICY 
····································· ······························································ ·························. 
There are moral dimensions not only to how we treat others who are alive today, but 
also how we treat future generations. By using up natural resources, without leav-
ing compensating endowments of physical capital, we leave futnre generations more 
impoverished. This violates principles of intergenerational eqnity or social justice. Many 
developing countries today are exploiting their limited natural resources, without ade-
quate provisions for the futnre. There are accounting frameworks (green accounting) 
that are designed to encourage better intergenerational equity. Governments shonld be 
encouraged not only to use such accounting frameworks, but also to set aside funds or to 
invest in physical and humau capital. 
Perhaps the most important determinant of environmental degradation (including 
that related to carbon emissions) is population growth. Population growth imposes a 
wide variety of externalities (a point recognized long ago by Edgeworth21). Countries 
with high rates of population growth have a hard time increasing incomes (per cap-
ita), and thus face a greater prospect of increasing poverty. Indeed, in the last decade 
of the last century, in the race between improving standards of living and popula-
tion growth, the latter won: while the percentage of the population in poverty fell, 
the absolute number of people living in absolute poverty increased. Those with large 
families not only have a hard time feeding their children (and childhood malnutri-
tion has lifelong effects), but they cannot afford to educate them, thereby condemning 
another generation to poverty and suffering. We now have the means of controlling 
population. I would argue that there is a moral obligation for governments to pursue 
such policies. 
CRISES 
·················· .................................................. . 
Earlier, I briefly alluded to the moral dilemmas I saw when confronting the East Asia 
financial crisis. I do not want to address here the problem of parsing out "blame" 
for the crisis and the failed management of the crisis. I want to focus on the ethics of 
21 Edgeworth, Francis Ysidro. 1925. Papers Relating to Political Economy. London: Macmillan. 
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international advice and assistance. To be sure, policies within the affected countries 
did contribute to the crisis: corruption and inadequate financial regulation played their 
part. But that is not the issue. The issue is how to intervene in the crisis in ways that min-
imize the damage, particularly to the poor, providing at the same time the foundations 
for correcting the underlying problems. The IMF failed to do this.22 The interests offor-
eign creditors were put ahead of the concerns for the workers and small businesses, with 
devastating effects, from soaring unemployment to plummeting wages. These parties 
were innocent bystanders; it was not their borrowing that had led to the crisis. Food sub-
sidies for the poor were cut, just when they were most needed. The political and social 
unrest-with many people dying-was predictable, and predicted. 
What is the moral responsibility for those who push for the policies that had such 
disastrous consequences? Especially when their prior advice, encouraging and even 
demanding rapid capital market liberalization, was probably the single most impor-
tant factor contributing to the occurrence of the crisis in the first place? And, even 
more so, when the policies put forward fail to have the predicted outcomes, the IMF 
and the US Treasury shifted blame to the country-and in doing so contributed fur-
ther to investor flight. As Jeffrey Sachs pointed out, it was like crying fire in a crowded 
theater. Not only is doing so bad economic policy, and an abuse of the trust and con-
fidence placed in the institutions. It is also arguably a fundamentally immoral act, just 
as crying fire in a crowded theatre-knowing that doing so might generate a riot and 
needless death-would be an immoral act. These are questions that all too seldom 
have been raised within international institutions or the governments that dominate 
their policies. But they are the questions that are increasingly being asked by ordinary 
citizens both in the developing world and in the more advanced industrial countries. 
The governments in power, which acquiesced in those policies, bear some respon-
sibility, but they often view themselves as having no choice-and indeed, were told 
that they did not in effect have any choice. The outside advisors did have a choice in the 
advice they prescribed. Indeed, there was controversy about the appropriateness of dif-
ferent policies. Thus, the issue is not whether the affected countries themselves and their 
governments bear some responsibility; they do. Rather, my concern here is the moral 
culpability of the IMF, which it has yet to recognize. 
22 The IMF has claimed that the quick recovery of several of the countries affected by the crisis is 
proof that its medicine works. A closer look at the pattern of recoveries does not support this conclusion, 
as I argue elsewhere. The country that has been the most assiduous follower of the IMF prescriptions, 
Thailand, years after the crisis still had a GDP below the pre-crisis level, and almost 40 percent of loans 
were still nonperforming. Malaysia had a quick recovery, but never had an IMF program. Indonesia, too, 
remained in a deep recession for years, partly attributable to the riots that were inspired by the failed IMF 
policies, partly attributable to the fact that those policies led to massive bankruptcies from which the 
country was slow to recover, and partly due to the strategy of restructuring the financial system, which 
led to runs that undermined the entire private banking system. Korea's relatively quick recovery in part 
was due to the fact that it did not listen to the IMF at key points: had it followed their advice in disposing 
of the so-called excess capital in the chip industry, it would have missed out on the global turnaround in 
that market that fueled the recovery. The growth in Russia and Brazil was because of the devaluations, 
which the IMF policies only delayed. 
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I want to briefly refer to several of the ethical dimensions of the IMF's behavior. 
First, in providing its advice, advisors did not act honestly in conveying the risks and 
nncertainties and in presenting the range of alternatives. Second, there is the issne 
of the trade-off between devaluations and interest rate increases and moral issues 
concerning responsibility. The IMF held that only by increasing interest rates could 
they forestall further declines in the exchange rate. Iu fact, the high interest rate poli-
cies were ineffective in forestalling the decline in the exchange rate, and may have 
actually contributed to it: by helping to deepen the recession/ depression, capital was 
induced to flee, rather than be attracted into the country. But this mistake in eco-
nomic judgment23 should not be confused with the deeper moral issue. At the root 
of the crisis in several of the countries was excessive borrowing abroad. Those bor-
rowing could have-and most economists would say, should have-a btained "cover" 
(effectively insurance) against a change in the exchange rate. No government guar-
antees its exchange rate; and there is no such thing as fixed exchange rates. Exchange 
rates change; the only difference in regimes concerns the frequency, magnitude, and 
more generally the rules that govern those changes. The market was, in effect, tell-
ing borrowers that there was a risk of devaluation (in equilibrium, the difference 
in interest rates at home and abroad is equal to the expected rate of change of the 
exchange rate, plus a risk premium). The stance of the IMF, once the crisis occurred, 
was to bail out those who had gambled on the exchange rate not changing (who had 
not bought cover), at the expense of the innocent bystanders. In a sense, those who 
caused the crisis, by borrowing excessively abroad in the short term, were let off the 
hook (at least partially), at the expense of those who were only engaged in normal 
business borrowing. Put this way, the bailout raises disturbing moral issues, beside 
the broader moral hazard issues that have been extensively discussed (the pattern 
of IMF inspired bailouts reduce the incentive of those borrowing abroad to obtain 
cover as well as the incentives oflenders to engage in due diligence in assessing credit 
worthiness.) 
23 There were other mistakes in economic judgment: the IMF concluded (without deep empirical 
work) that allowing the exchange rate to fall would harm the economy more than letting interest rates 
rise. In fact, in several countries, this was almost surely not the case. For instance in Thailand, those who 
borrowed abroad were the real estate firms (and those who had lent to the1n), who were already dead, in 
the wake of the collapse of the real estate bubble, and for whom a further fall in the exchange rate would 
have had little effect (though it may adversely affect the amount that foreign creditors could obtain); and 
exporters, who would gain as much in earnings as they would lose on their balance sheet. Perhaps the 
reason that they did not go into a close empirical evaluation of the effects was that that was not really 
their concern; they were more focused on the impact of the countries' ability to repay the loans to the 
creditors that they represented in the advanced countries (e.g., US and European banks). But this change 
in mandate from the purposes for which the institution was created-to help sustain a country in the 
face of a threatened downturn-and this obfuscation of the true objective of the policy (if correct) is itself 
deeply troubling, and raises moral issues. 
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GROWTH AND POVERTY REDUCTION 
STRATEGIES 
Today, everyone pays obeisance to the importance of reducing poverty. The IMF changed 
the name of its program for developing countries from Enhanced Structural Assessment 
Facility (ESAF) to incorporate the words "poverty and growth:' Trickle-down econom-
ics-whereby one justifies programs that make the rich still richer by arguing that the 
benefits eventually trickle down to the poor-is no longer in fashion. But putting rheto-
ric aside, there is an active debate concerning economic policies. The position of the US 
Treasury and the IMF can be characterized as "trickle-down plus": growth is necessary 
and almost sufficient for reducing poverty, and consequently the best strategy for help-
ing the poor is to adopt growth-maximizing reforms-the same neoliberal agenda, with 
its emphasis on privatization and liberalization, that prevailed over the past two decades, 
augmented by education and health. The modifications in the traditional formula rep-
resent important steps in the right direction. But the underlying prescription is faulty 
in several respects. The fact of the matter is that the countries that have been most suc-
cessful in development over the past half a century-the countries of East Asia-have 
not followed the Washington Consensus policies. And many of the countries that have 
followed the Washington Consensus policies have not done particularly well (though 
the "doctor" claims that the prescriptions were not followed sufficiently closely). Honesty 
should have dictated full disclosure: the evidence in favor of the Washington Consensus 
policies is at best mixed; and failing to provide such honesty raises moral issues. 24 
But perhaps more important, concern for the poor should have dictated greater atten-
tion to the consequences of the policies for poor, and an awareness that the countries 
that have done the best job of reducing poverty have gone well beyond a reliance on 
triclde-down economics. Some examples help illustrate what I have in mind: 
• The countries that have done best in improving the plight of the poor have had an 
explicitly pro-poor growth strategy that goes beyond simply paying lip service to 
education and health. 
Unless the poor are given assets-such as in land reform-they are likely to remain 
mired in poverty. But land reform may challenge vested interests. It is curious that 
although those who currently own large amounts of wealth in many of the poor 
countries acquired this wealth in ways that have little legitimacy (e.g., through the 
exercise of brute force by colonial masters), taking wealth away from these indi-
viduals is viewed as an abrogation ofbasic values of"property rights:' 
24 Interestingly, in the 1996 World Development Report: "From Plan to Market" on transition, the 
most successful transition-that of China-is given short shrift, being relegated largely to 'boxes:' Was 
this because its success-including its success in reducing poverty-ran so counter to the prevailing 
orthodoxy? 
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• The disparity between the ownership of resources (such as land) and labor results 
in institutions, like sharecropping, that lead to attenuated incentives and reduced 
output. Under sharecropping, tenant farmers face, in effect, a tax rate of 50 per-
cent (or more). Although the IMF speaks out strongly against high tax rates, and 
their enervating effects on effort, it has not spoken out as strongly in favor of a land 
reform that reduces these agency problems and increases economic efficiency at 
the same time that it increases equity. 
• Some of the economic reforms advocated by the IMF and the US Treasury have 
dubious effects on growth, but increase the country's vulnerability to shocks. 
(Capital market liberalization represents the most obvious example.) It is the poor 
who inevitably bear the brunt of the downturns, regardless of the lip-service paid to 
the importance of creating safety nets. Honesty would require observing that even 
in the most developed countries, safety nets for farmers and the self-employed are 
inadequate. 
• Even the benefits of trade liberalization become questionable unless accompanied 
by measures that enable the creation of new enterprises and jobs. But IMF packages 
often have accompanied trade liberalization measures by high interest rates that 
would make job creation a virtual impossibility, even in a well-functioning market 
economy. The point is a simple one: trade liberalization often leads to a loss of jobs. 
The free market ideology argues that this enables a flow of resources from less effi-
cient uses to more efficient uses. Were that the case! The problem is that in many 
less developed countries markets do not work well (that is part and parcel of being 
less developed). Unemployment rates are high. job creation is difficult. Moving 
labor from low productivity jobs to unemployment decreases a country's GDP and 
increases poverty. But often, that is precisely the effect ofIMF packages combining 
liberalization with high interest rates. 
• And even if the country is successful in creating new jobs, the poor may be adversely 
affected, because greater openness can lead to greater sensitivity to shocks from 
the outside world, the brunt of which is borne by the poor. Insecurity is one of the 
major problems facing the poor, and policies that increase that sense of insecurity 
adversely affect the plight of the poor. 
• Privatization programs have often had adverse effects, particularly on the poor. 
The rapid privatization programs have led to privatization of monopolies, with-
out regulatory oversight; and these monopolies, though they may or may not 
have proven more efficient in production, have sometimes proven more efficient 
in exploiting consumers. Privatization has proven an important vehicle for both 
corruption and increasing inequality, a point brought out forcefully by the expe-
riences in Russia. Indeed, one of the incentives for rapid privatization was that 
those that received state assets below market value then made a contribution (not 
just in terms of finance, but also in terms of the even more valuable organizational 
support and media coverage) to support Yeltsin's reelection. The silence in the face 
of the corrupt loans-for-share deal spoke loudly: the means seemingly justify the 
end! 
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The IMF has taken a particularly narrow (and peculiar) definition of good bud-
getary policy, in which foreign aid is not included, or is discounted, as a revenue 
source. The alleged reason for this is that foreign aid is volatile, and therefore can-
not be counted upon. The World Bank analyzed this allegation, and showed that 
tax revenues were even more volatile. Hence, according to Fund logic, tax revenues 
should not be included in revenues either, in which case no country is in budgetary 
balance. More to the point, the appropriate response to volatile income flows is flex-
ible expenditures. Countries build new schools and health clinics as they receive 
the money; when the aid stops, so does the construction. In long discussions with 
the Fund, I have never seen an adequate justification for the Fund's stance. But the 
consequences should be clear. It means that an increase in foreign aid may not 
result in more schools or health clinics, only more money going to the country's 
reserves. 
The economics of these policies has long been debated, both within the economics 
profession and within civil society. My point in raising these issues is not to rehearse 
that debate, but to emphasize the moral dimension. The budgetary stance of the Fund 
means that fewer schools and clinics are built, to the detriment of the poor. Other poli-
cies described above increase the risks faced by the poor. In some cases, such as capi-
tal market liberalization, these policies seem of questionable benefit to the country as 
a whole, though they might bring benefit to the financial communities both within the 
country or, more likely, abroad. But there have been sins of omission as well as commis-
sion: land reform would have arguably increased both equity and efficiency. 
In retrospect, as we look back at the colonial policies, at the unfair trade treaties 
foisted on Japan, at the Opium Wars, we shudder at their seeming lack of moral justi-
fication. We look with derision at writings describing the White Man's Burden, espe-
cially in light of its legacy in Africa and in so many other places in the colonial world. 
We no longer use military power to open markets or to enforce debt contracts, but the 
advanced industrial countries do use their economic power. They use their economic 
power to forge international agreements in which disproportionate benefits accrne to 
the developed countries, and in which, the less developed countries are sometimes even 
worse off. In this section, I have asked whether the same objections raised to colonial-
ism could, in fact, be applied to the economic policies foisted on these countries. Even 
when they help the poor, are there alternative policies that might have helped them even 
more, or that would have imposed less risk on them? Have the international institutions 
that have pushed these policies been honest in portraying these risks? Have they been 
dishonest in exaggerating the evidence concerning their economic benefits? (Certainly, 
the benefits promised from economic reform in Russia have far exceeded what has been 
delivered.) Perhaps we should ask, Will our children's children look at current economic 
relationships with the same shock-the same sense of moral outrage with-which we 
look at the colonial experience? The experiences in Seattle and Washington, and exten-
sive conversations with young people around the world, suggest that we may not have 
to wait for these reactions: the youth of today are questioning the moral legitimacy of 
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these policies. The defenders of these policies claim there is no alternative; there is a 
single recipe for snccess. In this they are wrong, and if there was a single best recipe, the 
countries that have succeeded in simultaneously growing and reducing poverty would 
have given credence to the view that it is not the one that the international institutions 
have prescribed, with their inadequate attention to democratic, equitable, and sustain-
able development. 
A GENERAL PERSPECTIVE 
Ethics has to do with an individual's relationship with other individuals, with the com-
munity and with society more broadly. Ethics involves the recognized moral rules 
required to live together in well-functioning communities. It is wrong to murder or 
assault or otherwise cause harm to another. But in modern societies harm to others can 
be done in a variety of ways-when an individual litters, he harms the environment, and 
hence injures the well-being of anyone who values the environment. Simple maxims 
such as "do unto others as you would have them do unto you" or "don't do unto others 
as you would not have them do unto you" and touchstones such as Kant's categorical 
imperative provide widely accepted guidelines, though to be sure, the world is complex 
enough that the application in particular circumstances may not be obvious, or even 
unambiguous. Earlier, we observed that from today's vantage point, we look on slavery 
with abhorrence, and view colonialism-and the colonial mentality-as a violation of 
basic ethical norms. But is one person's-or one country's-imposition of his will on 
another, by force of economic power more acceptable than an imposition by force of 
military power? In the 19th century, the two were often intertwined, with military power 
being used to enforce economic obligations. Today, matters are, perhaps, more subtle, 
but does this malce them any more acceptable? In ordinary life, it would be viewed as a 
breach of ethical norms to take advantage of an individual's temporary misfortune, but 
at the international level, this is sometimes seen as simply the natural state of affairs. 
Should the imposition of conditions on the countries that needed finance in the 1997-
1998 crisis-conditions that were unrelated to the crisis, or to the repayment of the 
loan-be considered a breach of ethical norms? Even if it is (at least from the perspective 
of the party imposing the conditions) for the good of the other party? 
Many ethical precepts are concerned with actions that undermine "community." The 
development process, no matter how well it is carried on, typically undermines some 
traditional values, some aspects of traditional culture. But if carried on in the wrong 
way, it can have a devastating effect. The way that the transition from communism to a 
market economy was carried out in Russia was a disaster, by any account, with poverty 
soaring and output falling, while a few people garnered huge riches for themselves. No 
wonder there has been a complete erosion in the sense of community, in basic norms of 
behavior, matched by the growth of"mafia" activity. Economists have begun to talk about 
these ideas in terms of the concept of social capital. One of the reasons for the difference 
between China's successful transition and Russia's failure is the relative preservation of 
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social capital in the former and its destruction in the latter.25 But we also know that eco-
nomic policies play a critical role: transitions accomplished through Bolshevik means, or 
with Bolshevik speed, or with the Bolshevik lack of concern for building social consen-
sus, are more likely to lead to an erosion of social capital. In the case of Russia, the rapid 
privatizations helped erode what little social capital was left over from the communist 
reign: they resulted in a few individuals seizing control of vast assets formerly owned by 
the state, with free capital mobility almost inviting them to take their ill-begotten gains 
abroad, while the state claimed it did not have enough resources even to pay pensions. 
We often talk about the "social contract:' The social contract is never formally written 
down, but it can nonetheless still be broken, or be perceived to be broken. Hyperinflation 
is widely criticized because it undermines the social contract. What happened in Russia 
has been widely viewed within as a violation of the social contract. While the IMF 
argued during the midst of the 1997-1998 crisis that not repaying creditors was a vio-
lation of the sanctity of contracts, even though bankruptcy is a central institution in 
capitalism, they seemed to pay little attention to the violation of an even more important 
contract, the social contract. 
If, as a result of the erosion of the social contract, there is a weakening of social cohe-
sion, in ways that lead to more violence, more corruption, and more crime, then what 
is the culpability of those who have contributed to this evisceration of social capital? 
To what extent should they be held morally responsible for the consequences, espe-
cially when these consequences are the predictable-if not inevitable, at least highly 
likely-result of their actions? 
I am raising here some fundamental issues: earlier, I argued that economic policies 
often give too little attention to their effect on the poor, to the sense of security. I suggest 
that this is a violation of basic ethical precepts. But economic policies are typically even 
less concerned with their impact on the community, on traditional social safety nets and 
traditional relationships. "Flexible labor markets" mean that employers should feel free 
to discharge workers as soon as they are not needed; there is no moral obligation to see 
workers through the hard times. Any policy that undermines the sense of community, 
social norms, a country's culture and pride, can, from this perspective, be viewed as a 
violation of ethical principles. 
INDIVIDUAL AND INSTITUTIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 
The thesis that I have advanced so far is that policies toward and within developing 
countries can be looked at from an ethical perspective, in terms of how they comport 
25 See A. Hussain, N. Stern, and J.E. Stiglitz. 2000. "Chinese Reforms from a Comparative 
Perspective:' In Incentives, Organization, and Public Economics: Papers in Honour of Sir fames Mirrlees, 
edited by Peter J. Hammond and Gareth D. Myles, 243-277. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
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with basic precepts of moral behavior; and so too can the behavior of those who are 
called on to provide economic advice to developing countries. In these terms, we have 
seen that many of the actions undertaken by governments and recommended by outsid-
ers, including the IMF, do not fare well. There have been large-and some might argue 
unnecessarily large-adverse consequences for the poor. Take for instance the full toll 
that the IMF's handling of the Asian crisis has had. It was not only the increase in pov-
erty, but also that the cutbacks in social and health expenditures in, say, Thailand, exac-
erbated the economic downturn. And this led to an increase in the incidence of AIDS, 
and the poverty itself led to an increase in the trafficking ofchildren. 
In American jurisprudence, in many states, there is the principle of contributory 
negligence. All parties that had a role in the adverse outcome are held, in part, respon-
sible. Similar issues arise in the realm of ethics. To be sure, the governments made 
the final decision about what policies were to be pursued. But the governments were 
often pushed to undertake the policies by the IMF, and felt that they had little room 
for maneuver. Here, we do not have to parse the blame. What we can say unambigu-
ously is that the IMF and others who supported those policies-and especially those like 
the US Treasury who pushed those policies-bear considerable moral culpability for the 
outcomes. 
In the Holocaust, the world also came to an understanding that those who stand idly 
by when they see others commit (what they view as potentially) heinous acts also bear 
a certain moral responsibility. The institutions in our society that are the guardians of 
our morals have an especial responsibility for taldng up these issues. This is particularly 
important given the inadequacies in our system of global governance, where the voices 
of the poor and the voices of poor countries are barely heard, even in matters that affect 
their lives and livelihoods, where democratic principles are systematically ignored. The 
good news is that throughout the world today, there is a growing recognition of the 
importance of these issues. It is an opportune time for those with moral authority to 
raise their voices and join the chorus of the concerned. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The past half-century has shown that with growth, development is possible, but far 
from inevitable. It has shown too that growth with poverty reduction is possible, but 
it is far from easy. There are a host of ongoing policy debates about the best way to pur-
sue poverty reduction and growth. My concern in this chapter has not been to rehearse 
that debate-though inevitably I have had to touch on some of the more controver-
sial issues-but to suggest that there are dimensions of that debate that can be usefully 
examined from a moral dimension, from precepts concerning such values as honesty, 
fairness, and a concern for the poor. Some might argue that such language speaks to the 
heart, and not just the head. But I argue that decisions about public policies inevitably 
need to speak both to the heart and the head, that it is important to think deep and 
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hard about the moral dimensions of onr economic decisions. One can, and indeed one 
should, combine this kind of moral analysis with a hardheaded analysis of the conse-
quences and risks associated with alternative policies. Indeed, the lack of such a moral 
demand has all too often allowed ideology to have sway-an ideology that dishonestly 
claims more favorable and more certain benefits than the evidence would support, an 
ideology that suppresses meaningful democratic discussions of alternative courses of 
action, and that ignores, or at least puts insufficient weight on, the adverse consequences 
to the poor. Thus, I see the new humanism as a complement to hard economic reason-
ing, not antithetical to it; and I see the two working together as holding the greatest 
promise for a future international economic order based on social justice. 
